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The Psychology of Personal Constructs: Humanism without a Self 
 
Trevor Butt 
City University, London 
University of Huddersfield 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article, I briefly outline what I see to be the outstanding strengths of the 
psychology of personal constructs (PCP). These are: its roots in pragmatism and its 
rejection of dualism, its phenomenological approach to the person and its formulation 
of core role structure. The concept of core role sees the person as a social product, but 
once constructed, a centre for choice and agency. I begin with a critique of the ways 
in which PCP is perceived within orthodox psychology, proposing that its radical 
approach makes it difficult to classify.  I argue that it has humanistic features, but 
emphasize its rejection of a unitary self. I conclude by looking at the problem of 
hatred, contending that a PCP formulation helps us re-think this in a more useful way. 
 
 
Introduction. 
Most introductory texts on personality mention personal construct psychology (PCP) 
respectfully but briefly. The usual story they tell is that it was an early form of 
cognitivism, one that kept the approach alive during the arid days of behaviourism. 
Tribute is paid to its founder, George Kelly (1905-67), but the reader is left with the 
impression that it died with him. The reader is left to assume that contemporary 
cognitive behavioural therapy is the scientific heir to PCP. Personal constructs were a 
pre-scientific version of cognitions, and the construct system was an early attempt to 
make sense of how these cognitive entities affected each other. Yet the elaboration of 
PCP flourishes in Europe, North America and Australia, all of which have active 
constructivist organizations and hold bi-annual conferences. Italy is particularly 
vibrant in its development of PCP (See Gilberto et al., 2912), and I am honoured 
indeed to have a contribution in the first edition of Rivista Italiana di Costruttivismo 
 
Why the paradox? Why is PCP alive and well, while its death is assumed in 
mainstream psychology? I believe this is because PCP was never properly understood 
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by those orthodox psychologists who see it as a precursor to cognitivism. It is true 
that in a weak sense, everyone is a constructivist now. Psychologists now accept that 
the world as we perceive it is transformed by our construction of it. We never 
encounter the world in the raw; it is always served up cooked by our construct 
systems. This much seems congruent with cognitive psychology. But Kelly’s 
psychology was far more radical than this. In his preface to The Psychology of 
Personal Constructs (1955), he warns the reader that the familiar landmarks of 
psychology are entirely missing: 
 
..the term learning, so honourably embedded in most psychological texts, 
scarcely appears at all. That is wholly intentional; we are throwing it 
overboard altogether. There is no ego, no emotion, no motivation, no 
reinforcement, no drive, no unconscious, no need. (Kelly, 1955, p. x) 
 
Kelly’s theory uses unusual language, and takes common terms like ‘emotion’ and 
gives them entirely new meanings. He set out his theory in an unusual way, proposing 
a fundamental postulate from which other theoretical propositions flow in a series of 
eleven corollaries. Here is the fundamental postulate:  
 
A person’s processes are psychologically channelized by the way in which he (sic) 
anticipates events. (1955, p.46) 
 
This is a condensed and gnomic sentence, and we need to unpack it. Let us consider 
the term ‘processes’. Kelly could have said “ the way in which a person thinks, feels 
and behaves”. He does not do this, because his theory does not separate cognition, 
affect and behaviour. Orthodox psychology assumed this separation, which then leads 
to questions such as which cause which? For behaviourists, cognitions were mere 
epiphenomena, floating in the wake of behaviour change. Disputes about the causal 
power of cognition in relation to both behaviour and affect led to social learning 
theory’s ascendancy over behaviourism in the 1970s (Bandura, 1977;  Mischel, 1973; 
Mahoney, 1974). PCP does not find these separations useful. Everything is seen as 
channelled (and not caused) by the way in which we construe, or anticipate events. 
And our construing involves what we think of as thought, behaviour and emotion. 
Emotions are described in terms of the disturbances that ensue when construing 
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changes; there is no sudden change into the language of physiology as there is in 
orthodox psychology. We can construe emotions physiologically, but PCP is 
interested in how our action is psychologically channelled. So personal constructs are 
not like cognitions, in some way behind behaviour and causing it. They are in our 
action; we construe in action (Radley, 1973, 1977; Butt, 1998). 
 
Construing PCP as a species of humanism rather than cognitivism is I think, more 
convincing. But it is a very different humanism from that of Rogers (1980), in that 
there is no self at the centre of the person. In this article, I want to consider this 
selfless humanism. To do this, it will be necessary to think about the philosophical 
roots of PCP. Stressing the philosophical roots of the approach might be seen as 
eccentric in the Anglophonic world (Fransella, 2008), but I think it is important for 
two reasons. Firstly because Kelly begins his magnum opus in 1955 with a statement 
of his philosophical tradition. Yet the philosophical roots are very often latent and not 
made explicit (Warren, 1998). Secondly, these traditions have all proved enduring, 
and each has its adherents in clinical or social psychology. Making explicit these 
foundations helps us appreciate the links to other approaches, as well as the depth of 
the psychology of personal constructs.  
 
The Psychology of Personal Constructs and its Roots in Pragmatism 
Kelly declined any simple classification for his theory (Kelly, 1969a). As a pragmatist 
(Thayer, 1982; Warren, 1998; Butt, 2008; Cromwell, 2010), he saw knowledge 
primarily as a construction rather than a discovery; we make the world rather than 
find it. We cannot ever know what the world is ‘really like’. Who knows what it looks 
like to an ant or a dog? We are limited by our senses and our scientific instruments, 
and use these to order the world in order to anticipate and act in it (see also Maturana 
and Varela, 1998). Constructions then, are not to be judged in terms of their truth - 
their representation of things. Instead they are to be judged in terms of their 
usefulness. Ordering and classification have been invented to help us make sense of 
what William James famously called the ‘booming buzzing confusion’ around us. So, 
for a pragmatist, the question is not: is PCP a species of humanism, but does it make 
sense to think of PCP as a humanism? We remain responsible for our classifications. 
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Kelly (1955) begins his book with a statement of his philosophical position. This he 
calls constructive alternativism, and it clearly demonstrates his grounding in 
pragmatism (Butt, 2008). He distinguishes between events in the world, and 
constructions of them, or the way they appear to us. In practice, it is impossible to 
distinguish too sharply between them, because events are always mediated by 
construing. It is rather like the distinction between the phenomenologists’ noema and 
noesis (Husserl, 1936/70). As George Mead (1909/1982) had argued, we see the 
world in terms of what it can do for or to us. A thousand metre precipice is not in 
itself dangerous. I imagine that it presents no threat to a butterfly or a bird. But we see 
it as potentially dangerous because of the risk it presents to us. Nevertheless, not all 
people will see it in the same way. It might present itself somewhat differently to a 
mountaineer, who might see it as an exciting challenge rather than something to be 
avoided. Constructive alternativism proposes that all events are open to alternative 
constructions and the personal constructions adopted by a person are those that have 
proved useful in negotiating events. The way the world appears to us does not tell us 
how it appears to others. Of course, there will be culturally common constructions, 
but a psychotherapist would do well to emphasize the individuality rather than the 
commonalty of construction. 
 
PCP and Phenomenology 
As constructivists, we do not have to ask whether PCP is in fact a form of humanism. 
The question is whether it makes sense to see it thus.  And PCP might usefully be 
construed as a form of humanism, because above all, it emphasizes human agency. 
Kelly proposed that we think of each person as a scientist, forming and testing his or 
her theories. The behaviourism of Kelly’s time had seen the person as like a white rat 
or a pigeon, whereas psychoanalysis seen the person as the victim of unconscious 
forces. Contemporary cognitivism works on the model of person as computer. In 
terms of pragmatism, these are not incorrect models of reality. They are to be judged 
by how useful they are. Kelly (1969b) found that the ‘man the scientist’ model more 
useful in understanding his clientele. Contemporary constructivists often prefer the 
person as author model, in which the person is seen as implicitly writing his or her 
history, and thereby influencing the channels along which future action may run 
(Chiari and Nuzzo 2010). The basic unit in PCP is the personal construct, a 
likeness/difference contrast that endows a dimension of meaning on the world (See 
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Cromwell, 2011). The contrast pole of humanism is mechanism (Butt, 2008), or as 
Bannister (2003) termed it, a ‘clockwork psychology’, where behaviour is a response 
determined either by internal drives or an external environment.  
 
Contributing to a symposium on motivation, Kelly (1969c) made the case that we 
need not propose forces that energise behaviour. There are no incentives, motives, 
needs or drives in PCP. Such concepts stem from an assumption of the person as inert, 
waiting for forces to act upon them. If we assume that motion is an essential property 
of being, that ‘man is a form of motion’ (Kelly, 1955, p.48), then we take it for 
granted that people are always doing something, engaged on one project or another. 
We need an understanding of choice to make sense of the direction of their action, but 
not of motivation, forces that push or pull them into movement.  Motivation 
underlines a person’s passivity; the person merely responds to drives or reinforcement 
contingencies. They are either pushed or pulled by events.  Choice emphasizes 
agency. The person makes decisions and acts in the world. But from what position 
does the person make these choices? Who, exactly, does the choosing and charts the 
course of action?  
 
This is where the notion of self is usually called upon to explain agency. Self is seen 
as denoting the integration and unity of the person (Stojnov & Proctor, 2012).  
Rogers’ (1980) client centred therapy is based on beliefs about the self and how they 
are shaped by significant others. He proposed that each person has an actualizing 
tendency, a natural inclination to grow to achieve his or her full potential. But growth 
is stunted by the demands of others; our self image and self esteem are affected by the 
stultifying pressures of society. Counselling and therapy try to remove obstacles, with 
the therapist offering the unconditional positive regard that allows for unrestricted 
growth. Rogers’ root metaphor is horticultural. Like plants, people naturally grow 
towards the light. Poor soil and atmospheric traditions pervert the self, resulting in 
neurotic misery.  
 
Humanistic psychologists such as Rogers often claim that their intellectual roots lie in 
European existential phenomenology. Rogers frequently cited Buber, and the 
Wikipedia definition humanistic psychology mentions Sartre, Merleau-Ponty 
Neitszche and Heidegger. However, these roots in European existentialism are at best, 
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superficial and very selective. There is no concept of an essential self at the centre of 
the person in the philosophy of existence. Both Holland (1970) and Butt (1997) argue 
that the psychology of personal constructs is a much closer relative of existentialism. 
We can see that PCP is a form of humanism in that it sees the person as a centre for 
some choice and agency. But there are very few references to ‘self’ in The Psychology 
of Personal Constructs, and those few are rather dismissive. Take the first mention of 
‘self’, for example: 
 
Some writers have considered it advisable to try to distinguish between “external” 
events and “internal” events. In our system there is no particular need for making this 
kind of distinction. Nor do we have to distinguish sharply between stimulus and 
response, between the organism and his environment, or between the self and the not-
self.  (Kelly, 1955, p.55). 
 
As Stojnov and Proctor (2012) say, Kelly cut across the prevailing behaviourism 
versus humanism dimension. And I think this quote beautifully sums up the key 
features of PCP, as well as its roots in the pragmatism of John Dewey, whose 
philosophy and psychology, Kelly tells us, may be read between the lines of the 
psychology of personal constructs (Kelly, 1955, p.154).  
 
Kelly and Dewey 
Dewey was thoroughly committed to the abolition of those dualisms that he thought 
of as plaguing psychology. The separations of mind from body, the self from others, 
and the individual from the environment all led to inadequate analyses of the ways in 
which we act in the world (Hildebrand, 2008). Dewey saw our present notions of 
mind and body as dating from Pauline Christianity (Dewey, 1925/1997, p. 204). The 
splitting of the two is an essential part of Christian doctrine. The body is corrupted 
and corruptible; the source of sin and all that is wrong with humankind. The spirit is 
eternal and can be saved when the lusts and passions of the body are mastered. The 
soul and the spirit have since evolved into minds, and later, selves. Psychology, he 
thought, was dogged by this dualism, one that had been perpetuated by the fervently 
Roman Catholic Descartes.  
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Clearly a scientific psychology cannot accept a ‘no go’ area of an internal mind, and it 
was in this context at the end of the nineteenth century, that the appeal of a new 
behaviourism began to take shape. Dewey warned against taking the reflex arc as the 
unit of analysis in psychology (Dewey, 1896/1982). He recognised the need to escape 
the notion of a soul, or mind in the body. The adoption of the reflex arc was, he 
thought, a mistaken attempt to replace this dualism with a crude monism. But the 
separation of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ processes– the former in the nervous system 
and the latter in the environment – led us away from the unitary and purposeful nature 
of action. He takes the example of a child being attracted to a candle flame and 
subsequently being burned by it. To see this as a succession of stimuli and responses 
is to fragment and disrupt the flow of action. Action is coordinated and only properly 
understood in a particular context, not as a series of jerky reflexes that are in some 
way welded together. What happens in the above example is that the meaning of the 
flame changes for the child. The whole process does not begin with a sensory 
stimulus. If it begins anywhere, it is with the act of looking. This is an action, an 
inquiry, and not a matter of a sensation impinging on the body. What develops is not a 
reflex arc, the welding of a stimulus to a response, but a continuous circuit of sensori-
motor action. People are not inert until a stimulus impinges on them. They are, to use 
Kelly’s phrase, ‘forms of motion’.  
 
Stojnov and Proctor (2012) point out that the crude monism of behaviourism was 
countered as dualism crept back as the soul morphed into the self. Rogers notion of 
the self with its sense of potential and drive towards it mirrors the demonology of 
Descartes. The notion of  ‘being oneself’, ‘being true to oneself’ ‘finding oneself’ all 
rest on the assumption that any action can be matched against some internal truth and 
declared in some sense invalid. Of course we all sometimes want to disown what we 
have done, and have all acted in ways which in retrospect, we wish we had not. But is 
this evidence of not being oneself? Here is Kelly:  
 
A good deal is said these days about being oneself. While it is a little hard for 
me to understand how one could be anything else, I suppose what is meant is 
that one should not strive to become anything other than what he is. This 
strikes me as a very dull way of living; in fact I would be inclined to argue that 
all of us would be better off if we set out to be something other than what we 
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are. Well, I’m not sure we would all be better off – perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that life would be a lot more interesting. (Kelly, 1969d, p.157). 
 
Here Kelly is emphasizing his commitment to what he terms elaboration through 
extension. This is the idea that through personal experiment we can extend our 
horizons and change what we are. In a series of corollaries to fundamental postulate, 
he proposed ways in which personal change is both allowed and restricted by our 
personal construct system. It is important to note that PCP proposes this regulatory 
feature on change. We are not free to just act in any way we want; there is a sense of  
accountability to some core process. This is very different from the social 
constructionist view of a distributed self (Gergen, 1991; Stojnov and Proctor, 2012), 
where the person’s conduct simply varies with the social context.  
 
Core structure and core role 
The personal construct system has within it some construing that is particularly 
important in that it is essential to what Kelly calls the person’s ‘maintenance 
processes’. This Kelly calls core construing. He doesn’t tell us exactly what he means 
by maintenance processes, but clearly, the implication is that they are essential for the 
person. The metaphor of ‘core’ is interesting. It is tempting to take it as simply 
meaning ‘ self’, and there are certainly similarities. But it is not a direct translation. 
When we consider the core of a fruit, we can see that it is indeed essential for its 
maintenance. The core differs from the peripheral flesh (Kelly also uses the term 
‘peripheral’ as the contrast to core processes). The fruit comprises both core and flesh, 
but without the seeds at the core, there would be no more apples or pears. 
Nevertheless, the core is material, and made up from the same material as the flesh. It 
is not spiritual, occupying a different dimension and obeying different laws. The self 
is the heir to the spirit and the mind, but the core is part of the material person.  
 
Of particular importance is what Kelly terms ‘core role structure’. Kelly took his 
understanding of role from the pragmatist George Mead (Butt, 2008). We play a role 
with someone when we act in the light of their construction of our action. So we take 
account of their different point of view as we shape our action. Core role relationships 
are those that are particularly central to us. It denotes role relationships that are 
important to our maintenance processes. So we may not care that our behaviour 
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appears brisk and cold to a customer, but care very much if it is seen this way by our 
partner or children. Kelly stresses the importance of these core role relationships in 
the experience of guilt (Kelly, 1969e). Guilt he suggests, is he awareness of 
dislodgement from our core role. If important others do not recognise me in my 
action, I am thrown into doubt as to who I am.  
 
Following Mead, Kelly thought that it is the ability to take another’s viewpoint that is 
a uniquely human achievement. It is what gives us self consciousness. This emphasis 
on core role relationships makes what we might loosely term the self a social product. 
It is not, as it is for Rogers, a spiritual core or individual entity that pre-dates our 
interaction, but fashioned out of those social processes. Like everything else, self is a 
construction. It is something that is made and not found. It follows that the ‘selves’ 
that we produce vary in accordance with the different types of significant others that 
make up our social world. In traditional societies, people lived in communities in 
which they had face-to-face contact with a limited number of people. This may still be 
the case in isolated rural settings, but in the modern world we have a number of quite 
different important relationships. We live with one set of people, work with another, 
and join interest groups with different people again. So we might feel quite authentic 
with family members, colleagues, students, clients and different friends, even though 
our conduct varies enormously. Saying who is your best friend might present a 
challenge, as we find that different friends bring out different aspects of us, all of 
which are important. The fact that we are contemplative with one and boisterous with 
another might seem quite natural and indeed nourishing to us. We might find no sense 
of dislodgement and discomfort as we move from one type of role relationship to 
another. What might seem fragmentary to an observer presents no contradiction to us. 
Kelly’s is a phenomenological approach that understands action from the actor’s point 
of view. The possibilities and restrictions on the flow of action are modulated by the 
construction of core processes. 
 
The community of self 
Miller Mair (1977, 2011) drew on these ideas to propose the notion of self as 
community rather than a unity. A community is a small collection of individuals that 
have face-to-face relationships. He suggests it useful to imagine such an articulated 
series of role relationships within each of us. The metaphor of a community releases 
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us from the problem of what our ‘true’ self is, and from wondering what the authentic 
self is. We do not feel as though we are acting or pretending when we conduct 
ourselves quite differently in different social contexts. PCP is a phenomenological 
approach in that it seeks to understand each person by seeing things from their point 
of view. What seems uncomfortable and out-of-character to one will not appear so to 
another. An understanding of a sense of social ease will rest on an analysis of the core 
role relationships comprising each person.  
 
Butt, Burr and Bell (1997) carried out a grid study to investigate the sense of self (for 
a description of grid method, see Bell, 2003). A structured interview was carried out 
with a small group of individuals in which each was asked to identify a series of 
people with whom they had different though important relationships. They were then 
asked to consider this group in pairs: how do I act differently when I am with 
Massimo from when I am with Viv? In grid terms, the different self-relationships are 
termed ‘elements’ while the differences in action are ‘constructs’ When the 
interviewee had exhausted their range of action, they were asked to consider these 
constructs and elements in a grid form. This allows them to consider how each 
construct applied to each element on a yes/no basis.  
 
The interviewer and interviewee then examine the completed grid together and search 
for patterns. One pattern in particular was of interest was what it meant to the 
interviewees to ‘be oneself’. Most of them spontaneously produced such a construct, 
so one might say “ when I’m with my dad I can be myself, but with Tom I watch what 
I say”. The most striking finding of this study was that ‘being oneself’ for any 
individual could mean exhibiting a wide range of action. It did not mean acting in a 
certain way. So one participant conducted himself in very different ways with the two 
people with whom he felt to be himself. With one he was quite domineering, whereas 
with the other he tended to defer to that person. ‘Being oneself’ meant a combination 
of contradictory traits. What did characterize ‘being oneself’ was being unself-
conscious, not watching oneself all the time and monitoring one’s behaviour. It was 
lending oneself to the joint action (Blumer, 1969; Shotter, 1993; Butt, 2004) that was 
naturally produced in action. Paradoxically, being oneself involves letting yourself go 
and allowing yourself to be carried along in the current of joint action.  
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Mair (2011) shows how the community of self metaphor can help us to understand 
ourselves. He takes the example of when he was asked to join an interview panel 
looking for a senior clinical psychologist. He found that he had a wide range of 
reactions to the candidates when he read their applications. He makes sense of this by 
separating the different selves he find himself assuming. He named these: 
Anxious; feeling uneasy at the task in hand 
The Teenage Rebel; wanting to kick out the clear favourite 
The Reformer; taking a long view about the ole of clinical psychology 
Mr Fair Minded; wanting to hear all sides of the arguments 
Mr let’s Get This Done With; saying that establishment candidates always win 
– be pragmatic and get the job over with. 
 
The point of the metaphor is that it helped him to both inhabit and detach himself 
from each player in the community. He installed Mr Fair Minded as chair of the 
group, insisting on balancing the other voices. So through reflection, he was able to 
take a superordinate position from which he could, as it were, own but not be driven 
by any particular position.  
 
Hatred 
I want now to consider the use of the community metaphor in dealing with feelings of 
hatred. I choose hatred because it is seen as pivotal in different versions of human 
nature. Rogers saw humankind as basically good. People were only perverted and evil 
when they were thrown off course. Society is seen as producing the problem. This 
was in contrast to the psychoanalytic view developed by Klein (1932), who recycled 
the doctrine of Original Sin. Here, humankind is seen as a naturally harmful species, 
civilized and held in check by authority, either external or internalized. We have 
already noted that Dewey saw Pauline Christianity as emphasizing and propagating 
this; the body is weak, prone to being overcome with passions. Only with the help of 
a priest (or psychoanalyst) can the person ward off this evil. Since The Fall, 
humankind has been excluded from the Garden of Eden. The suffering of hatred, lust 
and pain are its lot. Hatred holds a special place for psychoanalysis. Klein’s paranoid 
position is not proposed as a developmental stage from which one may emerge. It is a 
psychic position; forever available and easily accessed. Hatred is the basis of human 
being. 
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For the pragmatists, the person is basically neither good nor evil. Kelly mentions the  
Garden of Eden myth in at least four of his later papers (Maher, 1969), and it is 
central in Sin and Psychotherapy (Kelly, 1969e), arguably a pivotal paper in Kelly’s 
work (Butt, 2008, Cromwell, 2008). In his personal construct analysis, Kelly sees the 
person as having to make a series of choices: between companionship and loneliness, 
obedience and adventure, and ultimately between good and evil. Kelly had been 
raised as a Presbyterian, and perhaps because of this Christian upbringing, he saw 
good versus evil as a construct dimension that could not be avoided or re-construed 
(Butt, 2008). But Kelly does not regret the forsaking of the Garden. For him, 
humankind is at its best when it chooses through extension and pushes its boundaries. 
Better to choose a life of inquiry than one of blind obedience. However, we do not 
know where inquiry and experiment will lead us, and frequently they result in 
unintended consequences that we regret. Kelly takes us through some of the strategies 
that people adopt to avoid taking responsibility for their actions and these resemble 
Sartre’s concept of bad faith. Anxiety and guilt are necessarily part of the human 
condition as we experiment. It is said that Robert Oppenheimer regretted his work 
that had led to the production of the atomic bomb, and President Truman derided him 
as the ‘cry-baby scientist’ (Hamilton, 2011). Perhaps Kelly had such examples in 
mind, as he wrote Sin and Psychotherapy at the height of the Cold War, and, indeed in 
the year of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
 
There is surely little doubt that much human evil is the result of hatred. The wishing 
of harm to others is one corollary of having developed a moral sense. A sense of 
having been wronged is the source of a variety of reactions in different people, of 
which hatred is surely one. Midgley (1984) surmises that for anger to be transformed 
into hatred, the hated other has perhaps to be endowed with an unlikely range of 
feared and loathed attributes that the hater wishes destroyed. Perhaps this is why other 
people’s hatreds appear so ridiculous: the nazis’ belief in the plot of Jewish world 
domination, the Islaamist’s loathing and fearing of all western reforms and the 
abominations carried out by Protestants and Catholics in mediaeval Europe (and 
contemporary Northern Ireland). Yet our own hatred seems so natural (mine of nazis, 
violent Islamists and crusading Christians). We all know what it is to hate, though 
undoubtedly some hate more than others.  
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So are our hatreds visited on us?  In the Judeo-Christian tradition, re-worked but 
preserved in psychoanalysis, hatred is seen as fundamental to humanity. The best we 
can do is to own up to it and control or perhaps channel it. Like hunger or sexual lust, 
it has the status of a drive. But for the pragmatist, there is no inevitability about it.  
Pragmatism always questions authority, subjecting it to scrutiny. The common 
experience of hatred is undeniable, and perhaps it is its prevalence, as well as its 
destructiveness, that has led to its being thought of as fundamental. In English, we 
talk of ‘nursing a grudge’, and in the early nineteenth century, William Hazlitt wrote 
an essay entitled The Pleasure of Hating  (2004). This covert enjoyment of hatred 
should make us think about an alternative formulation. It suggests a reluctance to 
forgive, based on a gratification in staying with hatred. 
 
Hatred as Choice 
In this final section, I want to revisit Kelly’s concept of choice, and to argue that it 
helps us to understand the experience of hatred. Kelly argued that faced with two 
alternatives, we choose the one that makes most sense to us (Kelly, 1955, 1969c).  
The elaborative choice, as Kelly terms it, is not necessarily the one that gives most 
pleasure or satisfaction, but the one that helps us make sense of the world, and 
supports our world-view. This choice is not usually conscious. We make choices all 
the time, without reflection and deliberation. Nevertheless, our choices are intentional 
and not haphazard. I have already said that constructs are not cognitions, but that we 
construe in action. We find ourselves always moving, always construing, and action 
in Dewey’s sense incorporates what orthodox psychology divides into behaviour 
affect and cognition. Kelly emphasizes all this in his discussion of good and evil 
(Kelly, 1969e). people make what is for them the elaborative choice, and it leads them 
forward, sometimes into evil.  
 
When we think of choice in everyday life, the image of choosing between two things 
we want comes to mind. But as Kelly (Kelly 1969c) points out, too often we are in 
dilemmas, choosing between the lesser of two evils. The neurotic paradox was the 
original focus of Kelly’s formulation, where the person continually chooses what 
appear to others as self-defeating strategies. The pattern of action chosen and repeated 
is not one that leads to enjoyment, though it leads to a world that the person can make 
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sense of. But of course, this type of choice is by no means restricted to the neurotic. If 
we consider the experience of hatred as an elaborative choice, what might be the 
alternative it is preferred to? In an excellent phenomenological study on the 
psychology of forgiveness, Halling (2008) concludes that resentment and hatred are 
frequently preferred to the alternative feelings of weakness and helplessness. It is 
sometimes easier to hate than to cry; it preserves the integrity of a person, holding 
him or her together. The value of good phenomenological work is that they excite the 
thrill of recognition in the reader.  The findings chime with aspects of your own 
experience.  It helps you reach for something you have hitherto not been able to 
articulate. I found this reading Halling’s work. Of course, it cannot be claimed that 
every report of hate is explained exactly by this formulation. Wittgenstein’s 
arguments about the labelling of emotion (1972) are convincing; different people will 
mean slightly different things by a common term. Hatred may well be the elaborative 
choice in relation to a number of alternatives.  
 
The implications of this re-framing of hatred are what matters. If we think of a person 
as inhabited by a unitary self or spirit, and as hatred as fundamental to humankind, the 
voicing or experiencing of hate is evidence of ‘what you are really like’, or really 
believe. It lies deep within you and has to be dealt with. To overcome hate might 
involve channelling it differently, revisiting it, learning to control it, or wrestling with 
it – perhaps talking yourself out of it using CBT techniques. But it must be met head-
on because it is basic to your makeup.  If we see the hate-voice as one among many in 
the community of self, different alternatives open up. Mair did not find it necessary to 
silence the teenage rebel within him. This voice did not have to be argued with or 
expelled form the community. It was accepted as part of the grouping, but not allowed 
to dominate it. Certainly it is important to keep hate in check, but perhaps one remedy 
is simply to do something else, to call on other perspectives from which to construe 
events. Hateful feelings can be accepted and can be transitory, as there are other 
voices that can be called upon. One feature of Kelly’s therapeutic approach (and 
indeed, his approach to education generally), is that it is not necessary to give up what 
you are doing while you try out something new. The elaboration of new construing 
does not necessitate the immediate rejection of old. 
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One thing we might find in experimenting with new perspectives, is that we have 
forgiven the hated other. Halling’s study (2008) indicated that forgiveness cannot be 
willed. It is no good trying to forgive someone. Like trying to sleep, there was often a 
paradoxical effect of preventing the desired result. His research participants often 
found that they had forgiven in retrospect. While not focusing on hate or resentment, 
the hatred had lost its edge. Sometimes participants found that their hatred vanished 
unexpectedly when they encountered the hated other. A new perspective of the other 
as vulnerable enabled them both to see the other differently and to accept their own 
sense of weakness. This finding echoes the experience of the English novelist George 
Orwell (1945/68). He had been a strong opponent of fascism in the 1930s and had 
enlisted in the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. He had hated nazis and 
all that they stood for. But as a journalist in 1945, he visited an American prison camp 
in Germany and witnessed the cruelty meted out to captured SS officers. He found 
that he took no enjoyment from this, somewhat to his surprise, was disgusted by it. 
 
The finding that we cannot effectively will forgiveness does not mean that it is 
unintentional. Halling (2008) argues that we do not forgive against our will. Again, to 
use the example of sleep, we cannot will it, but encourage it by putting ourselves in a 
position where it might come. So what we can do is put ourselves in a position to 
accept a change and be open to new possibilities. Too often, we ‘nurse the grudge’. 
Kelly would term this elaboration through definition; finding ways of staying the 
same. Elaboration through extension is more difficult, requires more confidence and 
indeed, more courage. And this, once again, is Kelly’s message about the Eden myth. 
 
In Summary 
We have considered the classification of the psychology of personal constructs, 
emphasizing that categories should not be seen as immutable, but should be used and 
modified according to our needs. I have argued that it does not do justice to PCP to 
see it as a species of cognitivism. In many ways it resembles what has been termed a 
humanistic approach. It is certainly phenomenological, has strong similarities to 
existentialism and sees agency as a key feature of humankind. But there is no self, no 
spiritual centre of the person, one that acts like a gyroscope silently guiding the 
individual to fulfil his or her potential. From a constructivist perspective, there is no 
central command mechanism providing integrity to the person. Instead, the sense of 
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self is distributed but co-ordinated according to core role construing, leading to self as 
community as a better metaphor.  
 
What difference does this make? I have taken the example of the experience of hatred, 
looking at the implications of this community of self approach. With a notion of a 
deeply rooted (probably largely unconscious) real self, hatred is seen as a fundamental 
feature of humankind. In individuals who are ‘good haters’, the roots of the hatred 
have necessarily to be confronted in order to bring about change. Challenge has been 
seen as the essential strategy. PCP accords no special place to any emotion. Drawing 
on studies in existential phenomenology, it is suggested that encouraging new 
ventures and even ignoring hatreds might provide a better strategy for change. 
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